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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
INFANTS-PRE-NATAL INjUREs--LEGAL ENTITY.-Plaintiff sustained in-
juries in an accident caused by a collision between her automobile and that
driven by an employee of the defendants. Plaintiff, who was then in a
pregnant condition, was crushed against parts of the automobile, bruising
her and causing her to give premature birth to twins, one of which was
born badly bruised and died 19 days later, as a result of the injuries suf-
fered in the accident. The jury's award of $5000 as compensation for in-
juries to plaintiff was uncontested, but an award of $1250 for loss of ser-
vices of the child was the cause at issue. Held, reversing the Court of Civil
Appeals (1932) 47 S. W. (2d) 901, that damages for loss of services cannot
be recovered for pre-natal injuries. Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v.
Jordan et ux (1935), 78 S. W. (2d) 944.
The Death by Wrongful Act statutes create a "substituted" right which
is dependent upon the decedent's right to recovery immediately before he
died. Michigan Cent'ral R. Co. v. Vreeland (1912), 227 U. S. 59.
In the first case to adjudicate the instant situation, Dietrich v. Northamp-
ton (f884) 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242, it was said by Holmes, 3., "no
case, so far as we know, has ever decided that if the infant survived, it
could maintain an action for pre-natal injuries." Since that time the follow-
ing adjudicated cases have affirmed the doctrine that there can be no recov-
ery for pre-natal injuries resulting from the negligence of another. Walker
v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (1891) Ir. L. R. 28 C. L. 69; Allaire V. St. Luke's
Hospital (1900) 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638, 48 L. R. A. 225; Gorman v. Bud-
long (1901) 23 R. I. 169, 49 AtI. 704, 55 L. R. A. 118; Buel v. United Ry.
Co. (1913) 248 Mo. 126, 154 S. W. 71, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 625; Nugent v.
Brooklyn Heights R. Co. (1913) 139 N. Y. Supp. 367; Lipps v. Milwaukee
Electric Co. (1916) 164 Wis. 272, 159 N. W. 916, L. R. A. 1917 B. 334; Drob-
ner v. Peters (1921) 232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567, 20 A. L. R. 1503; Stan-
ford v. St. Louis, etc. By. Co. (1926) 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566.
The rule is based primarily upon the ground that the child before birth
is in fact a part of the mother, and therefore there is no duty owing to
the unborn child, apart from the duty to avoid injuring the mother. Frey,
Injuries to Infants En Ventre Sa Mere (1926) 12 St. Louis L. R. 85. The
legal rule that a child en ventre sa mere is a nonentity was expressed in
Thellusson v. Woodford (1798) 4 Ves. Jr. 227, 335, 31 Eng. Reprt. 118,170.
This rule is now restricted and the more modern view is that a child born
after the accident is given a legal existence for purposes beneficial to it.
Cooper v. Heatherton (1901) 73 N. Y. Supp. 14. Yet, despite the fact that it
is beneficial to be born uninjured, the above stated doctrine has not been ap-
plied in actions to recover for pre-natal injuries. A search of the cases
reveals that the rule has been limited to where property interests are in-
volved. In view of this, posthumous children are deemed in esse for the pur-
pose of taking property granted to them by will. Co. Litt. 36; Aubuchon V.
Bender (1869) 44 Mo. 560; Kimbro v. Harper (1925) 133 Okla. 46, 238 Pac.
840. The law which protects the property rights of an unborn child might
easily afford relief for the more serious wrongs inflicted upon him affecting
his life, limb, and health. Boggs, J., dissenting in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hos-
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pital, supra. An unborn child is granted a legal existence for purposes
other than for taking property devised to it. In criminal law, see Lee v.
State (1921), 124 Miss. 398, 86 So. 856; 37 C. J. 347. That afterborn chil-
dren are provided for in divorce decrees see Laumejer v. Laumeier (1924),
237 N. Y. 357, 143 N. E. 219. The furthest extension of the doctrine has
been in permitting a posthumous child to recover damages for the death of
his father caused by the negligence of another. Nelson v. Ry. Co. (1890),
78 Tex. 621, 14 S. W. 1021; Bonnarens v. Ry. Co. (1925), 309 Mo. 65, 273
S. W. 1043. But the courts have been stubbornly giving weight to prece-
dent and refuse to allow recovery for pre-natal injuries.
Some justification for the denying of recovery is found in the practical,
as distinguished from the technical, reasoning. To permit recovery would
undoubtedly give rise to fraudulent litigation, with false and speculative tes-
timony, which the defendant would find difficult to refute. Drobner v.
Peters, supra. The principal case asserts that even to deny recovery for
loss of services will make no material difference, since the jury in awarding
damages to the mother will be sympathetic to her cause. Also consideration
must be given to the problem that damages for loss of services is highly
speculative. This being so the decision can be reconciled with the law of
damages which provides that compensation cannot be based upon a mere
conjectural probability of future loss. Houston Land & Loan Co. v. Texas
Co. (1911), 140 S. W. 818; Wilson v. Weil (1878), 67 Mo. 339.
There can be no quarrel with those decisions which are influenced by the
practical considerations, but those decisions which deny recovery solely on
the technical "nonentity" theory cannot be approved. It is to be hoped that
the problem will be settled on the basis of logic and principle rather than
on stare decisis.
W. F. '37.
Lmn-QuALIw PRrvI.GE=-FAm COMMENT-ACTION FOR LIBEL.-A
newspaper, in its Sunday magazine section, published an article which com-
mented both on the protagonists and the findings in an ecclesiastical trial in
which the plaintiff, a minister, was expelled from the church for alleged
immoral conduct with a woman parishioner. Held, that defendant news-
paper had a qualified privilege to publish an account of the charges, trial,
and findings before the church tribunal; and that it had a right to com-
ment upon true facts, when they were matters of public concern, by stating
inferences and conclusions about them, provided that such statements were
made in good faith and without malice. Warren v. Pulitzer Pub. Co. (Mo.
1934) 78 S. W. (2nd.) 404.
Qualified privilege is available as a defence when the defamatory com-
munication is made in the discharge of some duty, moral or social, and the
inference of malice is nullified by the occasion, depending upon the absence
of actual malice. Shurtleff v. Stevens (1879) 51 Vt. 501; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co.
a'. Richmond (1889) 73 Tex. 568, 11 S. W. 555. The proceedings of the
church are quasi-judicial, and therefore those who complain, or give testi-
mony, or act or vote, or pronounce the result orally or in writing, acting in
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